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Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and
the Constitution t
By PETER W. SPERLICH* AND MARTIN JASPOVICE**

The Functions of the Grand Jury

THE grand jury

is an integral part of the administration of justice in

in the United States, and, at least potentially, is an important instrument of popular government.'

The basic functions of the grand jury

are indictment and investigation.

Both functions are exercised at the

federal as well as at the state level.

The Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . ."
Most state constitutions
also provide for grand jury indictments in capital and felony cases.
Federal and state grand juries, furthermore, have broad powers of in-

vestigation. They can initiate and conduct investigations of public officials and agencies2 as well as of private persons and organizations.3
@ Copyright, 1974, Peter W. Sperlich & Martin Jaspovice.
tThe authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance received from the Institute bf
Governmental Studies and the Department of Political Science of the University of
California, Berkeley. This article is the first in a series of three articles by the authors
discussing grand juries.
* Associate Professor, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
** B.A., 1969, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1972, University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law. Member, California Bar.
1. The grand jury first emerged in England in 1166 with the issuance by -Henry
II of the Assize of Clarenon. The initial functions of the grand jury were fact finding
and prosecution, in the service of the Crown. It was not until 1681 with the trial
of the Earl of Shaftsbury that the grand jury found its independence, refusing to return
an indictment expected by the Crown. See generally W. HoLDswoRTH, A HIsToRY OF
ENGLIsH L&w (7th ed. 1956); G. EnwARDs, THE GRAND JuRy (1906).
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970) (special grand jury investigating criminal
activity with no restrictions as to whether criminal activity must be that of public official
or private person); CAr.. PEN. CODE § 917 (West 1970) (grand jury may inquire into
all public offenses committed or triable within the county); CAL. PEN. CODE § 919
(West 1970) (grand jury shall inquire into the condition and management of public
prisons within the county, and the willful or corrupt misconduct in office of public

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 1

It is of extraordinary significance for the health and survival of
representative government that grand juries discharge their duties fairly
and efficiently. The grand jury's importance extends beyond its

indictment and investigation functions.
by other agencies.

These could be carried out

Some states have reassigned the indictment func-

tions to the district attorney's office, so that felony prosecutions are
initiated by the prosecutor's "information" rather than by grand jury

indictment.

Similarly, committees of various legislative bodies rou-

tinely carry out investigations. The parallel capabilities of other agencies, however, do not render grand juries superfluous. There is something special in grand jury proceedings which cannot be found in the
workings of other institutions, for the grand jury occupies a position
of unique importance and -trust in the United States system of government.

Grand jury members are not normally professional politicians,
bureaucrats, or members of the legal professions. The duration of
service is short. 4 There is little opportunity for gain in grand jury
service; it is but poorly remunerated, 5 and it does not provide a clear

step in, or toward, a public career. Self-interest and self-promotion
surely rank very low with grand jurors. At the same time, a grand
jury has vast and important powers. It may subpoena witnesses,' conduct secret hearings, 7 file reports,8 call for public actions and govern-

mental reform,9 and authorize or block criminal prosecution.
The indictment function of the grand jury serves not only to permit the initiation of prosecution when there is adequate cause, but
officers within the county); In re Schuler, 210 Cal. 377, 405, 292 P. 481, 493 (1930);
"The grand jury is an instrumentality of the courts of this state, and as such is charged
with a quasi-judicial inquisition into the conduct of citizens and of public institutions
and officials. .. ."
3. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3057 (1949) (bankruptcy investigation); 18 U.S.C. §
3331 (1970) (special grand jury investigating criminal activity).
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970) (eighteen month basic term); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 901 (West 1970) (one year basic term).
5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1871 (1965) (twenty dollars per day plus mileage); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 890 (West Supp. 1974) (ten dollars per day plus mileage).
6. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.2 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 890 (West Supp. 1974) (ten dollars per day plus mileage).
7. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 939 (West 1970).
8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970) (report submitted by special grand jury);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 925 (West 1970) (report concerning accounts and records of county
officers); CAL. PEN. CODE § 927 (West Supp. 1974) (report concerning salaries of
certain county officers); CAL. PEN. CODE § 928 (West 1970) (report concerning needs
of county officers); CAL. PEN. CODE § 929 (West 1970) (report concerning books,
records, and accounts of ex officio officers).

9. See, e.g.,

CAL. PEN. CODE

§ 932 (West 1970).
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also is designed to protect the accused against false charges.' 0 The
grand jury, when working properly, stands between the citizen and
spurious prosecutions that will be painful and costly even when in the
end he is found innocent. The investigative work of the grand jury
also can differ from the undertakings of other agencies." It is doubtful
that legislative committees can have the same credence as grand
juries even when private corporations are to be investigated. There
is no doubt, however, that in the investigation of public officials the
credence of a properly functioning grand jury will exceed that of other
bodies. One would expect scrutiny to be keener and fairer when the
watcher is not tied to the watched by political alliances or rivalries.
Grand juries should be the recipients of uncommon public trust.
They have the opportunity to serve the causes of justice and popular
government in unique and significant ways. Unfortunately, this opportunity has remained unrealized many times in many places. As
a result, the grand jury has come under repeated attack, and the need
for and validity of both of its functions has been a matter of considerable debate. Critics of the grand jury system have been able to document many shortcomings, and some states have responded by limiting
the indictment function. 2 Advocacy to abolish the indictment function persists in many places. To this has been added in recent years
a strong movement to abolish the investigative function, that is, the
grand jury altogether.'"
Lack of Representation and the Decline of the Grand Jury
Certainly the grand jury has suffered a significant decline in public esteem. The primary causes of this decline appear to be a lack
of independence and a lack of representativeness. Many grand juries
have been unable to resist and check the district attorney when they
had the obligation -to do so. In his critique of the grand jury system,
Judge Melvin P. Antell of the Essex County (New Jersey) District
Court wrote:
Actually, the concern of protecting the individual from wrongful
prosecution is one about which grand juries in general show little
interest. It is edifying indeed to a new prosecutor to learn how
10. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); United States v. Bailey, 332
F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
11. See generally, Symposium: Grand Juries, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 671 (1972).
12. Petersen, The California Grand Jury System: A Review and Suggestions for
Reform, 5 PAcirsc L.J. I, 2-3 n.15 (1974).
13. Note, Grand Jury: Powers, Proceduresand Problems, 9 COLum. JL. & Soc.
PROB. 681 (1973).
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willing people are to let trouble descend upon their fellows. In
positions of authority, many are prepossessed by fancied obligations to "back up" the police, to "stop mollycoddling." to "set examples." Attitudes of understanding, of patient inquiry, of skeptical deliberation, so needed in the service of justice, recede in
the presence of duly constituted officials and are replaced by a
passive acceptance of almost
14 anything which seems to bear the
sovereign's seal of approval.
Many grand juries also have permitted the district attorney (or
other public officials through him) to misuse their investigative powers. Particularly in recent years grand jury investigations have been
employed in attempts to harass and suppress protest groups, unpopular
minorities, and disliked journalists.' 5 In a report on the grand jury
system, The National Observer quoted Ronald Merlino, a Los Angeles
lawyer handling draft evasion cases:
The grand jury . . . can be used against anyone by a U.S. attorney with an ax to grind. I'm not saying that I'm a radical lawyer and there are Facists on the grand jury. I'm saying the grand
jury can be used by anybody, on the right or the left, as a very
nasty instrument of intimidation. 6
The paper also quotes Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina that the
motive of a number of recent grand jury investigations has been "to
suppress opposition. ' ' T
Grand juries also have been assailed because they are unrepresentative. In recent years, in particular, grand jury indictments have
been challenged on 'the grounds that members of certain ethnic groups
tend to be excluded from service. 8 Discriminatory exclusion of identifiable population groups generally is easier to demonstrate than
lack of independence from the district attorney. Therefore, challenges to grand jury indictments have been brought most frequently
on thd issue of exclusion. The key dases will be reviewed below.
They reveal that lack of independence and lack of representatives
are not unrelated. In many states, grand juries consist almost exclusively of members of "advantaged' social groups with fairly conservative social and political philosophies.' 0 It would be idle to pretend
14. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovl Lnment, 51 A.B.AJ.
154-55 (1965).
15. Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the A,'ministrative Agency
of the Prosecutor, 1 NEw MEXIco L. Rnv. 141 (1972).
16. The National Observer, Nov. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
17. Id. See also Pro and Con Discussion on the Question c

Curtailing Size and

Use of Juries, CONG. DiGEsr, Aug.-Sept. 1971.
18. Mar, The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, 1 PA clFe LJ. 36
(1970).
19. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
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that the personal and social characteristics of the jurors have no effect
on the proceedings and actions of the jury. Who serves does matter.
The point is not, of course, that members of the less advantaged
groups would somehow be more "objective." Rather, a jury which
does not include the full range of social groups does not include the
full range of social experiences, and consequently is not able to respond properly to the full range of issues and problems that come
before it. A jury of limited experience often has no alternative other
than to accept the prosecutor's presentations. For example, members
of social groups whose contact with law enforcement officers is limited
to such times and occasions when these officers are on their best behavior, have never experienced and cannot imagine the use of coercion, entrapment, and perjury on the part of law enforcement officers.
Such acts, however, do occur with regularity.20
"Who Serves?" is a crucial question in the grand jury system.
The well-known study by Kalven and Zeisel2 1 shows that different
ethnic, racial, religious, and economic groups display significantly varying jury voting patterns. That fact has been recognized as such by
the Supreme Court as well as by various minority groups. 22 But even
if there were no relationship between the composition of a grand jury
and what this body does, the question of membership would remain
important. Discriminatory exclusion violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Democratic
government cannot fulfill its promise if indiviudals or groups are denied access to the political process. Even if there were no relationship
between the composition of a grand jury and its actions, the question
of membership would remain significant because of its implications
for popular attitudes toward the government. Social groups that are
infrequently or never permitted to participate in the political process
do not develop or maintain loyalty and esteem for the political system and its institutions. Selecting representative grand juries is a task
and challenge of great significance.2 3
20. Cf. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE PowER 141-60 (1969); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WIrH-

TRIAL 103 (1966); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CaRim. L.Q.
17, 23 (1968); Jacobs, The Los Angeles Police, Tam ATLANIc MoNTHLY, Dec. 1966,
at 95.
21. H. KALvN & K ZEisEL, Tim AmmcAN JURy (1966).
22. See Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 129-30 (1940).
ouT

23.

Cf. AM. B. Ass'N, THE IMPbVEMENT Or THE ADINISTRATION OF JusnCE

62-64 (5th ed. 1971).
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Basic Provisions and Principles of Grand Jury Selection
Federal and State Statutory Provisions
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, governing the selection of federal grand juries, provides that "all citizens shall have the
opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries"
and that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded for service . . . on acount

of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."24 The
act provides for the random selection of grand jurors from voting registration records and similar lists.2 5 The object is to select a grand jury
panel that is representative and is "a fair cross section [of the persons
residing in] the community . . . wherein the court convenes." 26

The selection of state grand juries also is governed by statutes.
The state statutes provide for two types of selections. Some states
use random methods resembling federal selection procedures; other
states employ the key man system, 27 which allows jury commissioners
or judges to select prospective grand jurors from among their acquaintances or from among the acquaintances of "key men." Any person
in the community can be a "key man." Generally, however, "key
men" are of two types: friends or acquaintances of the jury commissioners, or leaders of particular subgroups in the community. Often
a hybrid of the above two methods is utilized. Thus, officials may
choose fifty persons whom they feel are qualified as grand jurors, and
twenty names will be chosen by lot from the original fifty.2"
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1970) prescribing penalties for selection officers who discriminate "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. .. ."
25. The selection of grand jurors generally is a two-step process. A grand jury
panel or venire is selected from among the eligible residents of the community; in turn,
the grand jurors are chosen from among the members of the panel. While the overwhelming majority of cases addressing the issue have taught that a challenge to the
makeup of a jury must be directed to the composition of the panel or venire, and not
to that of the eventually selected jury itself, a recent California Supreme Court case,
dealing with a petit jury rather than a grand jury, failed to make this differentiation.
Future litigation will show whether this failure was deliberate. See People v. Jones,
9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
27. See generally, Comment, Grand Jury Selection: Voter Lsts as Cross Section
of the Community, 52 ORE. L. Rnv. 482 (1973).
28. E.g., the Alameda County Grand Jury in California is chosen as follows: The
names of all judicial districts are placed in a hat in proportion to their populationso that some districts will be represented once, while others with larger populations
may be represented as many as six or seven times. Each of the superior court judges
draws three judicial districts (a single judge may draw the same district three times).
Then each judge selects one person from each judicial district he has drawn. The
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Most challenges to grand jury selection and grand jury membership have been raised at the state level and, most of those have been
raised regarding key man selection systems. Where a special effort
has been made by the grand jury selectors to consult leaders of the
distinguishable subgroups of the community population, in order to
insure cross-sectional representation, the key man system has been upheld.2" Abuse of the key man system has been successfully assailed,
and ordinarily is the product of the failure of the selectors to consult
with persons who are representative of all segments of the relevant
community.30 The courts have left no doubt that the states must comply with basic constitutional requirements regardless of -the method
of selection that they employ.
Statutory Exclusion
The major focus of -the following discussions will be litigations
which sought to quash grand jury indictments in states with key man
systems. The general principles of constitutionally valid jury selection,
however, are not restricted to that particular context; they apply to
grand juries in general, and even to petit juries.3" In this subsection
and the next, a brief overview will be provided.
One of the earliest cases to invoke the Constitution as a safeguard of proper jury selection was Strauder v. West Virginia.3 2 In
this case the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had affirmed
the conviction of Strauder, a black man, for murder, over his objection
that "[b]y virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored
man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or -to serve on
a petit jury . . ,. In reversing Strauder's conviction, the United
names of all persons selected in this manner are then placed in another hat; and a
drawing by lot is held to determine who will serve on the grand jury. Nineteen grand
jurors are selected in this manner.
29. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d
13 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1966); Chance v. United States, 322 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 823 (1964); United States v. Hunt, 265
F. Supp. 178, 194-95 (W.D. Tex. 1967). The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
precluded the use of the "key man" system on the federal level. 28 U.S.C. §§ 186163 (1970). The federal cases cited in this footnote were decided prior to the enactment of the 1968 Act.
30. See United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962);
Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
31. The same constitutional principles apply to grand jury selection and petit jury
selection. "Principles which forbid discrimination in the selection of Petit Juries also
govern the selection of Grand Juries." Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939).
32. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
33. Id. at 304.
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States Supreme Court applied the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment: "nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."3 The Strauder case seemed illogical to some persons who
quite correctly noted that the defendant had never proved that the
absence of blacks from the grand jury which indicted him and from
the petit jury which convicted him had prejudiced his case. The record is devoid of proof of racist tendencies or partiality on the part
of any of the jurors involved. Rather than address such issues of
proof, the Court felt compelled to rely upon certain sociological propositions:
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes
in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which,
therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those classes
the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy.
And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man
to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel
from which the state has expressly excluded every man of his race,
because of color alone, however well qualified
35 in other respects,

is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?
Legal commentators have accepted the validity of the reasoning
of the Strauder decision. One has noted that "[i]f the defendant is
a member of the race or other class excluded, the danger of prejudice
is great enough so that we will condemn the exclusion without looking
for actual prejudice. .

..

"-6

Discriminatory Application

While the Strauder decision laid the basic groundwork for future
discrimination cases in jury selection, its holding was actually quite
narrow: discrimination in jury selection affords grounds for removal
of the case to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443. Shortly
thereafter, in Neal v. Delaware,3 7 the Supreme Court dealt with a state
jury selection statute which was facially neutral, but which was applied
in a discriminatory manner. The Court concluded that the brand of
discrimination practiced in Neal was no less reprehensible than that
discovered in Strauder. The Court quoted with approval the follow34. U.S. CoNrsT. amend XIV, § 1.

35. 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879).
36. Scott, The Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal Criminal Juries,
34 IowA L. REv. 577, 584 (1949).
37. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
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ing construction of the Fourteenth Amendment found in the case of
Ex parte Virginia:
A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision,
therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers
or agents by whom its powers are executed, shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government,
deprives another of property, life, or liberty without due process
of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws,
violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed with the State's authority, his
act is -that of the State. 38 This must be, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning.
Thus, it was established quite early that neutral statutes which are
discriminatorily applied, as well as discriminatory statutes themselves,
may subject an indictment to successful attack.
Emerging Formulas for Selection
Cross-sectionalRather than ProportionalRepresentation
Since Strauder and Neal, the Supreme Court has sought to develop formulas for the selection of grand juries. These efforts have
been less than fully successful and much ambiguity remains. Three
basic formulas, however, can be found. The first of these indicates
that "representation" means cross-sectional rather than proportional
representation.
Representativeness can assume a variety of forms and is subject
to divergent interpretations. From Strauder to the present, the Supreme Court has consistently held that grand and petit juries must
be representative of the community. This, however, created as many
problems as it settled. In Smith v. Texas3 9 the Supreme Court initiated one of its first attempts at clarification:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups . . . vioconcepts
lates our Constitution . . . and is at war with our basic
40
of a democratic society and a representative government.
This language was subsequently interpreted to require that both grand
and petit jury panels be drawn from a cross-section of the eligible
community.
38. Id. at 397, quoting 100 U.S. at 347 (1879).

39. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
40. Id. at 130.
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While "cross-section' has never been operationally defined by the
courts, those applying it to jury selection cases have generally looked
to the makeup of the community to determine the extent to which
"identifiable groups" are entitled to representation on the jury panel
or venire.4 1
A further clarification came with Justice Murphy's classic statement for the Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates
an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.
This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all economic, social, religious, racial, political and
geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete
representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition
must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are
to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is
an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies
at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open
the door to class distinctions and discriminations
which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury. 42
The Court has consistently been careful to explain that proportional representation of races on a jury panel is not a constitutional
requisite. The logic underlying this assertion is simple: "Obviously
the number of races and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our
citizens would make it impossible to meet a requirement of proportional representation. '4 3 Similarly, the Court has adhered -to the proposition that the Constitution forbids proportional racial limitation.4 4
Random Selection to Achieve Cross-sectionalRepresentation
The cross-sectional principle requires that no community group
be excluded from the jury pool. This requirement is manageable only
if a random selection system is used, because there is a very large
variety of different "groups" within most county populations. In Hernandez v. Texas45 the Supreme Court displayed its cognizance of the
41. See Reece v. Georgia 350 U.S. 85, 87 (1955); Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F.
Supp. 117, 121 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
42. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
43. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950).
44. "An accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in
the selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race:'
Id. at 287.
45. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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problems attendant to the definition of "group" within the construct
of a required cross-section:
When the existence of distinct class is demonstrated, and it is
further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out
that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.
The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service
solely because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 46
Thus, a showing of distinctness is required before the inclusion of a
given group may be compelled. Exposition of community attitudes
has been suggested by the Supreme Court as an effective method of
demonstrating the existence of a cognizable and distinct community
group. Thus, in Hernandez, the following evidence was offered to
prove that the Mexican-AmericanR constituted a distinct class in a
given community: testimony by officials and citizens of the community
that residents of the community distinguished between white and Mexican; only slight participation in business and community groups by
Mexican descendants; segregated schools for Mexican children; one
prominent community restaurant displayed a sign reading "No Mexicans Served" and segregated men's toilets on the courthouse
47
grounds.
The approach forged in Hernandez was a flexible one in that
the Court recognized that different communities may possess different
distinct groups:
[c]ommunity prejudices are not static, and from time to time
other differences from the community norm may define other
groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group
exists within a given community is a question of fact. 48
The loose formulation of "distinct group" employed in Hernandez, coupled with the just recognition of the uniqueness of communities there, tends naturally to enlarge the scope of the jury pool. Black
persons aside, myriad groups have been recognized, based upon national origin, 9 name types, 50 work status, 51 religion, 51 age,53 educa46. Id. at 478.

47. Id. at 479.
48. Id. at 478.
49. United States ex rel Leguillon v. Davis, 105 F. Supp. 392 (D.V.I. 1953) (persons of Puerto Rican origin in the Virgin Islands); United States v. Fujimoto, 105
F. Supp. 727 (D. Hawaii), writ denied, 344 U.S. 852 (1953); ILWU v. Ackerman,
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tion,5 4 sex,55 and even political affiliations. 6 At least one court has
recognized as a distinct group a hybrid of these two classifications.5 7
The increase in the number of recognized community groups

makes it more difficult to fulfill the requirement of cross-sectional representation. Random selection of jurors from a complete community
list is the only manageable method available which will yield comprehensive cross-sectional representation over time. The use of key man
selection systems is highly unlikely to do so unless special efforts are

made. Realization of this fact led the Supreme Court to articulate
two constitutionally grounded affirmative duties to be adhered to by
key man selectors. The first such duty requires that key man selectors
familiarize themselves with all of the community's population elements
in which qualified jurors may be found.58 Encompassing the first but

broader in scope, the second constitutional duty is to refrain from following a course of conduct which naturally tends to exclude any group
of potential jurors from service."

While this two-fold obligation was

imposed in an attempt to achieve cross-sectional results within the confines of the key man approach, it has led to more confusion than correction.
PurposiveInclusion

Some jury selectors, believing that these court-imposed duties required the conscious selection of blacks in order to provide a fair cross82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1949) (Filipinos and others of Asian descent in Hawaii);
State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922) (Italians).
50. Montoya v. Colorado, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959) (persons with
"Spanish-sounding" names in Colorado).
51. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage earners in
California).
52. State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965); Schowgurow v. State,
240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W.
1091 (1925) (Roman Catholics in Texas).
53. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (Nouth); United States
v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (young adults);
United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1967) (young adults).
54. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) kthe less educated);
United States v. Bryant, 291 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1968), (the less educated); United
States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724 (D.Md. 1967).
55. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (women); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970) (women); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401
(M.D. Ala. 1966) (women).
56. Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452, 462 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd on other
grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
57. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966) (black laborers in Louisiana).
58. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950).
59. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940).
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section, began to purposefully include blacks on grand jury venire lists.
In Collins v. Walker,60 however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that purposeful inclusion of six black persons on a Louisiana
grand jury venire list violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The core of the Collins holding was that since
it had been decisively established that -the Constitution is "color-blind,"
inclusion as well as exclusion on the basis of race was proscribed. 61
Two years after the Collins decision, the Fifth Circuit again faced
the issue of purposeful inclusion of black persons on a grand jury
venire list, this time in Texas. The majority opinion in Brooks v.
Beto6 2 reversed its earlier holding in Collins. Concluding that the
Collins opinion had erroneously interpreted prior Supreme Court decisions, the Brooks court found that the dual duty imposed upon jury
selectors may require the conscious inclusion of blacks in some instances.6 3
The Brooks decision has been criticized for abdicating established
principles of constitutional neutrality.6 4 In the context of the key man
selection process, however, it can be argued that purposive inclusion
is necessary to obtain representation of a fair cross-section of the community. The Brooks court could have avoided the difficult constitutional problems inherent in a system of purposive inclusion, and at
the same time ensured the desired result with a higher degree of certainty, by requiring a random selection system.
Challenges and Litigation
Who has Standing?
Challenges to grand jury selection procedures must generally be
raised before commencement of trial, by pre-trial motion to quash an
60. 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964) affd on rehearing,335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1964)
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
61. On rehearing, the dissenting opinion of Judge Dawkins expressed dismay at
what was termed an insoluble dilemma posed by the majority's reasoning: while jury
commissioners were precluded from taking race into consideration by the majority opinion, still they were under a constitutionally imposed duty to achieve representation of
a cross-section of the community. 335 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1964).
62. 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
63. Id. at 23.
64. See, e.g. Note, Deliberate Inclusion of Negroes, 41 TUL. L. REv. 473 (1967).
The Supreme Court, of course, has sustained the use of jury lists limited to persons
of specified age, educational attainments, character, sound judgment, and similar statutory requirements. In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), the Supreme Court
even sustained the use of a "blue ribbon" panel of petit jurors, selectively chosen from
the regular pool of jurors on the basis of their intelligence as revealed by questionnaires and personal interviews.
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indictment returned by the grand jury.6 5 This requirement of a "timely" challenge is applicable to state as well as to federal cases, and
failure to comply with the appropriate procedure often constitutes
a waiver of the opportunity to object to the composition of the grand
66

jury.

Under the provisions of the federal Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968, any party to a federal action has standing to challenge
the validity of the grand jury selection system employed by a particular
federal district court, whether or not that party is a member of the
class of persons allegedly excluded from jury service."- Until recently,
this was not the case in most state courts. The majority of jurisdictions
required that the challenging party in state court be a member of the
excluded class as a precondition to that party's eligibility to successfully
challenge grand jury selection methods.
However, in 1972 the Supreme Court made applicable to the
states -the same liberal standing procedure which the 1968 Jury Selection and Service Act provided for the federal courts. In Peters v.
Kiff, the court held that "whatever his race, a criminal defendant has
standing to challenge the system used to select his grand or petit jury,
on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service the members
of any race, and thereby denies him due process of law."'3 s
The overwhelming number of challenges to jury selection processes have been initiated by criminal defendants in an attempt to compel the quashing of the indictment returned against them. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court condoned the use of a civil suit seeking
affirmative relief from alleged racial discrimination in jury selection.
In Carter v. Jury Commission,69 black citizens of Green County, Alabama, instituted a class action against the county jury commission and
its clerks, alleging racial discrimination in the selection of prospective
jurors, and against the governor of Alabama, charging that he had deliberately appointed an all white jury commission in the predominantly
black county. Although the suit failed, it was the unanimous view
of the Court that:
65. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1-897).
66. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
67. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 473 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68. 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972). The state of Georgia had held that Peters, a
white, had no standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury that
indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him.
69. 396 U.S. 430 (1970).
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Defendants in criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved
as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of
racial exclusion. Surely there is no jurisdictional or procedural
bar to an attack upon systematic jury discrimination by way of
a civil suit such as the one brought here. 0
That Carter condoned the use of a civil action to attack discriminatory jury selection methods is hardly surprising. It has been decisively established that once a state chooses to provide grand and petit
juries, it must hew to constitutional criteria ensuring that the selection
of membership is free of racial bias.
Basic Forms of Challenge
A challenge to the selection procedure employed in choosing
grand jurors or petit jurors can be presented in either or both of two
basic forms:
(1) The challenge can assail the constitutional validity of the
statute or plan which prescribes the manner of selection, asserting that
it is incapable of yielding the results demanded by law; or
(2) The challenge may concede the constitutionality of the governing statute, but attack the way in which -the statute is applied.
Strauderv. West Virginia7 ' embodies the classic example of the first
form of challenge. As discussed above, the West Virginia statute involved in this case explicitly prevented blacks from serving as jurors. To
the knowledge of the authors, no state at present maintains a law such
as that struck down in Strauder.
The second form of challenge prevails today. The application
of unassailed statutes can be attacked in three ways:
(1) By demonstrating a discriminatory outcome (membership)
of the selection;
(2) By demonstrating discriminatory procedures in the selection process, regardless of the actual outcome; or
(3) By demonstrating a combination of factors indicative of discrimination.
In pursuing the first of these methods, the challenging party must produce evidence relating to the general system of selection, that is, relating to a series of grand juries or grand jury panels. Single juries
or panels do not constitute adequate ground for the determination of
70. Id. at 329.
71. 100U.S.303 (1897).
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discrimination. Pursuant to each of these methods, however, the challenging party is not required to expose "intentional" or "purposive'
discrimination. Conclusive proof of one of the factors outlined above
will suffice. As stated by the court in Davis v. Davis:
Thus we need not delve into the subjective intent of the jury commissioners . . . nor need we credit their general assertions that
they did not participate in any system or plan by which Negroes
were systematically excluded from jury service.
since it is clear
that they did not fulfill their duty of familiarizing themselves
with
72
the qualifications of Negroes eligible for jury service.
Challenging Discriminatory Outcomes
The first form of challenge requires a statistical demonstration
of a discriminatory outcome. In other words, discriminatory selection
will be inferred from a showing that fewer persons of a specified identifiable community group actually were selected to the grand jury
panel than would have been selected to that panel if there had been
no discrimination. The initial assertion of this theory is set forth in
Neal v. Delaware:
The showing thus made, including, as it did, the fact (so generally
known that the court felt obliged to take judicial notice of it)
that no colored citizen had ever been summoned as a juror in
the courts of the state-although its colored population exceeded
twenty-six thousand, in a total population of less than one hundred and fifty thousand-presented a prima facie case of denial,
by the officers charged with the selection of grand and petit jurors,
of that equality of protection which has been secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 73
The Neal case is not unqiue. Several cases considered by the
Supreme Court had involved total or virtually total exclusion of a distinct class of persons from the jury panel. 74 " In such situations the
necessary statistical demonstration is uncomplicated and generally
made without difficulty. When the selection product is not so blatantly
72. 361 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1966). Similarly, in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 290 (1950), the Supreme Court noted: "The statements of the jury commissioners
that they chose only whom they knew, and that they know no eligible Negroes in an
area where Negroes made up so large a proportion of the population, prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimination in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights."
73. 103 U.S. 397 (1881).
74. E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (one black called within
memory on the mistaken belief that he was white); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (over a twenty-five year span, no Mexican-American juror ever served); Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (over a thirty-year span, only one black was summoned; no black ever served); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (in a sixteen year
period, no blaqks eveir called for grand jury service),
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unbalanced, the burden of proof becomes more complex and consequently somewhat more difficult to carry.
The initial burden faIls to the challenger to make out what has
become known as a "prima facie case of discrimination." This may
be accomplished by presenting a statistical analysis which reflects a
significant disparity over a period. of time between the percentage of
the allegedly excluded class existing in the community and the percentage of that same class which has served on the grand jury panel. 75
One commentator has explained the prima facie rule as follows:
Suppose, however, that Negrbes have appeared on juries, though
in a lower proportion than they occur among the eligible population. Obviously, not all eligible whites or Negroes are called for
jury duty, and a number of legitimate factors, including chance,
enter into the determination of who is called. The fact that a
higher proportion of whites than of Negroes is called, therefore,
does not itself give rise to an inference of discrimination. To suggest that discrimination is at work, and accordingly to call upon
the state to show that it is not, the discrepancy must be great
enough to eliminate chance as a reasonable explanation.7 6
Indeed, there is much evidence that while the Supreme Court considers the existence of exclusion as being the result of innumerable forces, the Court distinguishes between determinative and chance factors.
Thus, in Smith v. Texas,77 Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
stated, that "[c]hance and accident alone could hardly have brought
about the listing for grand jury service of so few Negroes from among
the thousands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal
qualifications for jury service.178 In Eubanks v. Louisiana7 9 a unanimous Court declared that "the uniform and long-continued exclusion
of Negroes from grand juries shown by this record cannot be attributed
to chance [or] to accident ...
."80 More recently the Court discussed "chance" in terms of statistical "probability," suggesting that
the existence or non-existence of a valid prima facie case is by no
means to be determined in an arbitrary manner:
75. "While each jury roll or venire need not be a perfect mirror of the community... any substantial disparity, over a period of time, between a group's percentage
thereon and its percentage in the eligible population is prima facie evidence of discrimination, regardless of the source of jurors, and shifts the burden to the prosecution to
justify the discrepancy." People v. Newton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 359, 390, 87 Cal. Rptr.
394, 414 (1970).
76. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. I- REv. 234, 252
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn].
77. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
78. Id. at 131.
79. 356 U.S. 584 (1958).

80. Id. at 587.
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While unnecessary to our disposition of the instant case, it is interesting to note the "probability" involved in the situation before
the Court. The record does not indicate how many Negroes were
actually on the "revised" jury list of approximately 600 names.
One jury commissioner, however, said his best estimate was 25%
to 30%, which is in close proximity to the 27.1% who were admittedly on the tax digest for 1964. Assuming that 27% of the list
was made up of the names of qualified Negroes, the mathematical
probability of having seven Negroes on a venire of 90 is
.000006.81
While the above quoted language makes it clear that the Supreme
Court is aware of the existence of probability theory, and of its application to the legal determination of the validity of a prima facie case
in jury selection, no court has yet decided a case on the basis of mathematical probabilities. Adoption of this technique in the field of jury
selection would be an invaluable innovation, lending both uniformity
of application and predictability to an area of the law which has lacked
both qualities for several years.
To date, the cases which have considered the prima facie rule
have been vague and contradictory. In Brown v. Allen"2 the Supreme
Court reached the conclusion that the defendant had failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. The evidence showed
that the general population was thirty-three percent black; the list of
male taxpayers used as source material for jury selection contained
sixteen percent black persons; that grand and petit juries in recent
years contained from seven percent to seventeen percent black persons; and that the grand jury which indicted, and the petit jury which
tried the defendant were respectively comprised of twenty-two percent
and fifteen percent black. In sharp contrast to the Brown case
is Swain v. Alabama,83 wherein the Court utilized an erroneous tech81. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967). More recently, in a case
quite similar to Whitus, the Court stated: "We take note, as we did in Whitus v.
Georgia, of petitioner's demonstration that under one statistical technique of calculating
probability, the chances that 27 Negroes would have been selected at random for the
400-member final jury list, when 1,015 out of the 7,374 questionnaires returned were
from Negroes, are one in 20,000." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 n.9
(1972).
82. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
83. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The erroneous method of computation utilized in
Swain has been followed by at least one state. See People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App3d 359, 390, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 414 (1970) (the disparity shown was the 7.5 percent
of jury panels were black versus a county black population of 12.4 percent); In re
Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d 640, 650, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971) (the disparity shown was
that 6.7 of the grand jury nominees were black versus a county black population of
12.4 percent),
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nique to find the defendant's prima facie offering insufficient. There,
blacks were found to have been represented on relevant jury venires
in proportions ranging from ten to fifteen percent, while the proportion of blacks in the eligible population was twenty-six percent. Surprisingly, the Court subtracted fifteen percent from twenty-six percent
and concluded that the disparity revealed between the relevant population and venires constitutued only ten percent. In actuality, these
figures demonstrate that blacks were underrepresented on Alabama's
jury panels by approximately fifty percent.8 4
In finding a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the
court in Whitus v. Georgias5 reversed a conviction on the following
facts: black persons comprised nine percent of the jury lists, twentyseven percent of the taxpayers from whom the jury lists were drawn,
and forty-two percent of the eligible population. Furthermore, the
Court in Turner v. Fouche0 concluded on the basis of statistics strikingly similar to those unsuccessfully produced in Swain that a substantial
underrepresentation had been shown:
The undisputed fact was the Negroes composed only 37% of the
Taliaferro County citizens on the 304-member list from which the
new grand jury was drawn. That figure contrasts sharply with
the representation that their percentage (60%) of the general Taliaferro County population would have led them to obtain in a
random selection. In the absence of a countervailing explanation
by the appellees, we cannot say that the underrepresentation reflected in these figures is so insubstantial as to warrant no corrective action by a federal court charged
with the responsibility of
87
enforcing constitutional guarantees.
The demonstration of an acceptable prima facie case does not
automatically produce a finding of discrimination. Such a show84. To illustrate the error in Swain, assume two jurisdictions, A and B, in which
the proportion of blacks in the respective populations is 85% and 20%. Assume further that over the years, jurisdiction A has maintained an average of 75% blacks on
its jury panels and jurisdiction B has maintained an average of 10% blacks on its jury
panels. It is readily apparent that the degree of underrepresentation in the two jurisdictions is radically different. Jurisdiction A has consistently maintained a representation of 88% of its black citizens, while jurisdiction B has only represented 50% of
its black citizens, yet the absolute difference between the percentages within the two
jurisdictions remains the same, i.e. 10%. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal noted
the inadequacies of the Swain subtraction calculation technique in Rabinowitz v. United
States, 366 F.2d 34, 56 n.55 (1966).
85. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
86. 396 U.S. 346 (1970). This is one of the few cases comparing the disparity
shown by the prima facie case to that which would have existed had random selection
been employed.
87. Id. at 359.
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ing simply raises a rebuttable presumption that discrimination has occurred, and is to be considered together with the fact that the choice
of prospective jurors is a selective process and that many legitimate,
non-discriminatory factors may produce racial or other disproportionalities. Therefore, once a prima facie case has been presented, the
burden shifts to the state or federal government to prove that the resulting disparity was not the product of discriminatory selection.
It is most troublesome that the Court has not yet set forth clear
standards against which statistical evidence could be measured to determine whether or not a prima facie case has been established. The
deficiency, however, can be remedied. As Kuhn notes:
The courts' continued reliance on intuitive and untutored understanding of the laws of chance is both unfortunate and unnecessary. Statistical theory supplies mathematical means for determining the likelihood that chance is responsible for a given discrepancy
between the ratio of Negroes in the eligible population and their
ratio on jury, lists, venires, or panels. Logic and objectivity would
seem to compel the application of such an analysis in determining
when the size of the discrepancy eliminates chance as its likely
source and thus requires the state to come forward with88evidence
explaining the discrepancy on non-discriminatory grounds.
Challenging Discriminatory Procedures
The second way of challenging grand jury selection requires a
demonstration that the selectors have indulged in a discriminatory administration of their duties. The existence or non-existence of a statistical prima facie case is wholly inconsequential to the success of this
method of challenge. Thus, even though the statistical evidence adduced was insufficient to establish a prima facie case, the Supreme
Court found discrimination in Cassell v. Texas:
Our holding that there was discrimination in the selection of grand
jurors in this case, however, is based on another ground. In explaining the fact that no Negroes appeared on this grand-jury list,
the commissioners said that they knew none available who qualified; at -the same time they said they chose jurymen only from
those people with whom they were personally acquainted ....
When the commissioners were appointed as judicial administrative
officials, it was their duty to familiarize themselves fairly with the
qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard
to race and color. They did not do so here, and the result has
been racial discrimination.
[D]iscrimination may be proved in other ways than by evidence of long continued unexplained absence of Negroes from
88. Kuhn, supra note 76, at 255.
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many panels. The statements of the jury commissioners that they
chose only whom they knew, and that they knew no eligible Negroes in an area where Negroes made up so large a proportion
of the population, prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimination in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights.89
The Cassell decision is premised in large part upon the two-fold
duty noted earlier, which the Supreme Court imposed upon jury selectors: first, each selector is constitutionally compelled to refrain from
any course of conduct which, whether intended or not, has the natural
consequence of excluding a group of eligible citizens from jury service;
second, jury selectors are under a constitutional duty to familiarize themselves with all of the community's elements in which qualified jurors may be found. Proof of a failure to properly execute either
of these responsibilities is equated by the courts with discrimination.
The familiarization standard is perhaps 'the vaguest area of jury
selection law yet developed. The burden it places upon jury selectors
seems to be quite heavy; however, aside from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Brooks v. Beto90 no court has attempted to articulate its limits.
While the fact that this concept has not been operationally defined
certainly marks a weakness in the law, it has a favorable impact on
the selection process in that the lack of specification serves to deter
the use of the key man system. Those states which wish to avoid
a multiplicity of jury challenges have been afforded an impetus, whether
intentionally or not, to adopt random selection procedures.
A challenger to the selection process who wishes to attack the selectors on the basis of their failure to acquaint themselves with relevant community groups must normally elicit testimony from the selectors. Most often, the selectors constitute one or more jury commissioners, making the task a relatively easy one. However, in some
states, superior court judges constitute the nominating body, raising
problems for the challenger. The number of judges in a given county
may exceed one hundred, 91 in which case their examination will be
quite time-consuming. Moreover, even where only ten or twenty
judges are involved, the challenger risks incurring their wrath by subpoenaing them to testify when they -would prefer to concern themselves with their own pressing calendars. Despite these factors, at
least one state has approved cross-examination of judges, though there
89. 339 U.s. 282, 287 (1950).
90. 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
91. E.g., Los Angeles County, Cal.
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is some doubt as to whether each and every judge-selector may be
summoned before the court.2
Of equal necessity is the examination of the selectors in court
if the basis of the attack on the selection procedures is that the selectors indulged in a course of conduct, either intentionally or innocently, which naturally tended to exclude a group of eligible citizens
from jury service. While this is an independent basis for successful
attack of selection techniques, few Supreme Court cases have been
decided on this ground alone. Whitus v. Georgia93 is illustrative. In
that case the defendant challenged both the grand jury which indicted
him and the petit jury which tried him, each of which was selected
from tax digests, as required by Georgia law. The tax digests were
compiled from "tax return sheets" which were white for Caucasian
taxpayers and yellow for black taxpayers. The names from the "tax
return sheets' were entered into a single volume tax digest, which
was divided into two sections, one for whites and one for blacks as
required by statute.9 4 Blacks whose names were included in the tax
digest were designated by a "(c)" placed opposite their names. The
jury commissioners testified that they never included or excluded anyone because of race or color, yet the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction:
Under such a system -the opportunity for discrimination was present and we cannot say on this record that it was not resorted
to by the commissioners. Indeed, the disparity between the percentage of Negroes on the tax digest (27.1%) and that of the
grand jury venire (9.1%) and the petit jury, venire (7.8%)
strongly points to this conclusion. 5
92. See Montez v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 343, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970)
(exclusion of Mexican-Americans in California). As the California Court declared
in In re Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d 540, 651, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1971), wherein it was
alleged that blacks had been excluded from jury service and the superior court had
denied defendant's request to examine the twenty Alameda County judges who selected
the grand jury: 'The judges in Alameda County have chosen to select the grand jurors
themselves, which is specifically authorized by Penal Code Section 903.4 . .. [but
by doing so, the judges constitute themselves collectively as the nominating body and
must, if an issue is presented on a motion to quash the indictment, be made available
for examination to determine whether constitutional standards were met. . . . If such
proceedings become burdensome, the judges are free to return the function to the jury
commissioner."
93. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
94. GA. AcTS 1894 at 31 (repealed 1966).
95. 385 U.S. at 552. While the jury commissioners testified that no one was either included or rejected on the jury lists because of race or color, this was held insufficient to overcome defendant's prima facie case. 385 U.S. at 551 (1967). It is now
an established rule that "affirmations of good faith in making individual selections are
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The selection system employed in Georgia was attacked on substantially the same grounds twenty years before the Whitus decision,
in Avery v. Georgia.9" There -theevidence showed that the jury commissioners selected prospective jurors from the county tax returns, and
printed their names on tickets which were placed in a jury box. The
names of white persons were printed on white tickets, and the names
of black persons were printed on yellow tickets. Thereafter the tickets were drawn from the jury box by a judge of the superior court
in numbers necessary to empanel a jury. The judge who drew the
tickets testified that he had never practiced discrimination of any type
in the discharge of this duty yet not a single black person was on
the particular panel from which Avery's jury was selected. The Supreme Court held that evidence of discrimination had been established:
Petitioner's charge of discrimination in the jury selection in this
case springs from the Jury Commissioners' use of white and yellow
tickets. Obviously that practice makes it easier for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Further, the practice has no authorization in the Georgia Statutes-which simply enjoin the Commissioners to select "upright and intelligent men to
serve as jurors . . . . 97
This is one of the few cases wherein the Court's holding hinges predominantly upon the conduct of the selectors as tending to perpetrate
discrimination. 8
In Williams v. Georgia,99 decided two years after Avery, the identical selection system in the same county involved in Avery was again
assailed. The Supreme Court had decided Avery almost immediately
after Williams had been tried and convicted by a jury selected from
the same white and yellow tickets. The case was remanded for consideration to the Georgia Supreme Court, over the state's contentions
that Williams had failed to lodge a timely challenge, and that the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to render a decision. In the
course of his opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter noted that "it
was the system of selection and the resulting danger of abuse which
was struck down in Avery and not an actual showing of discriminainsufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion."

Alexander v. Louisi-

ana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
96. 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
97. Id. at 562.
98. "Conduct," as used here, is meant to indicate positive action, as distinguished
from "omissions" such as are found in the area dealing with the duty of the selectors
to adequately familiarize themselves with the eligible segments of the community.

99. 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
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tion on the basis of comparative numbers of Negroes and whites on
10 0
the jury lists."'
Challenging On Several Grounds
Whitus, Avery and Williams set the framework for a recent Supreme Court decision dealing with the combination of factors approach. The petitioner in Alexander v. Louisiana.' moved to quash
his indictment on the ground that black citizens of Lafayette Parish
had been included on the grand jury list and venire in only token
numbers. 10 2 The evidence showed that the jury commissioners compiled a list of names from various sources, including the telephone
directory, city directory, and voters' lists, and sent questionnaires to
the persons on the list to determine their eligibility for grand jury service. The questionnaire included a space for indication of the recipient's race. It was further shown that twenty-one percent of the eligible population of the Parish was black; that of the returned questionnaires, nearly fourteen percent represented black persons; that the jury
commissioners attached to each returned questionnaire an information card designating, among other things, the race of the person who
filled it out; that of the four hundred questionnaires allegedly selected
at random from those remaining after ineligibles had been removed,
seven percent represented black persons; and that one black was on
petitioner's grand jury venire, but none actually served on the grand
jury which indicted him.
The court reversed petitioner's conviction, not on the basis of the
prima facie statistical case alone, nor on the basis of the use of a selection system which lends itself to discriminatory practices alone, but
rather on the basis of the "combination of factors" presented:
The Court has never announced mathematical standards for the
demonstration of "systematic" exclusion of blacks but has, rather,
emphasized that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case that
takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking
here, but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on
statistical improbability alone, for the selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral. The racial designation on both
the questionnaire and the information card provided a clear and
easy opportunity for racial discrimination. At two crucial steps
100. Id. at 382.
101. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
102. Petitioner also attacked the exr1usimn of women jurors, but the Court did not
Teach this issue in its decis oi
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in the selection process, when the number of returned questionnaires was reduced to 2,000 and when the final selection of the
400 names was made, these racial identifications were visible on
the forms used by the jury commissioners, although there10 3is no
evidence that the commissioners consciously selected by race.
Although the Alexander decision did not unfurl any new concepts, the "combination of factors" approach is particularly prominent
in the case. Because of this prominence, we may find added emphasis
on the totality of circumstances in future cases dealing with the law
of jury selection.'"
Judicial Ambiguity and the Task at Hand
Development of Clear Standards of Membership,
Selection, and Composition
The preceding sections have shown that state grand juries as well
as federal grand juries must meet some constitutional and statutory
standards of selection and composition. Failure to meet these standards, will result in the quashing of indictments. Those who must select
grand jury members and those who become the object of grand jury
action must know what these standards are, when they have been met
and when they have been transgressed. Unfortunately, no clear answers are available at present.
In a long series of decisions, many of which were examined above,
the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies have firmly established
the constitutional principle that the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to state grand juries. 105
The courts have also spelled out the general requirement that grand
jury panels must be truly representative of the community from which
they are drawn.' 0 6 However, the courts have not provided an operational definition of the key phrase of this requirement. The ambiguity
in the meaning of "truly representative," more than anything else, is
responsible for the many problems encountered in grand jury selections and grand jury challenges.
The Supreme Court has employed a number of descriptions. to
clarify the representativeness requirement: grand juries should be
drawn from cross sections of the community;' ° grand juries must be
103. 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972).
104. See Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1972); Hairston v. Cox, 459
F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1972).
105. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
106. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
107. Id. at 130,
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drawn from all identifiable groups of the community; 10 8 grand juries
must not exclude large and identifiable segments of the community. 0 9
These alternative wordings make it clear that representativeness
is linked to community groups (and the courts have gone to considerable length to specify the characteristics of groups which have legitimate claims to grand jury membership); they do not, however, reveal
when a jury drawn from "all identifiable groups" is "truly representative" and when it is not.
The Supreme Court also has set forth a number of limiting statements, that is, conditions which need not be met. Representativeness
does not mean that all grand juries must include members of each
and every identifiable community group. 1"0 Nor does the representativeness requirement demand exact proportional representation for the
various community groups."' Similar in effect to these pronouncements is the court's position that the composition of a single grand
jury may not provide adequate grounds for a test of representativeness,
but that a sequence of jury panels or venires may have to be consid2

ered.11

The prescriptive and the limiting statements taken together identify the "boundaries": no community group should be excluded from
grand jury service, but at the same time, no group need be represented
on a grand jury in exact proportion to its strength in the community.
What remains undefined is the constitutionally acceptable portion of
that wide range of numbers between no member and true proportional
membership. If a grand jury panel has one hundred members, and
if a group constitutes twenty percent of the community, to what number smaller than twenty may its membership decline before discriminatory exclusion must be assumed: ninteen, eighteen, seventeen. .. ?
The Court has not formulated a general rule by which the smallest allowable jury panel membership figure could be determined for
any group. Such a rule could be constructed. Probability theory can
supply the concepts and techniques for the determination of exact standards.
The task of setting precise standards is an urgent undertaking.
In their ad hoc resolution of cases regarding the issue of the minimum
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
Thief v. Southern Pacific, 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
Eiibanlis v. Lo isi~na? 350 U.S. 584 (1958).

Spring 19741

GRAND JURIES

membership constitutionally allowable, the various courts have been
far from consistent. Even the Supreme Court has been inconsistent
in the standards that it has applied to the cases that have come before
it. Deviations from true proportionality of similar magnitude have
been ruled to exceed the workings of chance factors in some cases,
and have been ruled to be within the range of chance in other cases." 13
In the absence of a clearly formulated general standard, only litigation can determine the constitutionality of a given jury. At a time
when the Supreme Court and other courts are greatly overburdened,
this is a matter of considerable import. If a general rule were available, defense counselors could determine without going "all the way
to the Supreme Court" whether or not the grand jury that indicted
the defendant was constitutionally composed. At the same time, if
clear standards existed, there would most likely be fewer unconstitutionally selected or composed grand juries. The reduction in litigation could be considerable, and, certainly, the admininstration and
the quality of justice would experience significant improvement.
The development of clear standards requires diverse inquiries
and tasks, too large in number to be fully detailed here. Some important examples, however, can be given. An acceptable statistical
standard must be developed and justified to serve as the benchmark
against which actual cases can be measured. Computational routines
must be developed to permit easy testing of concrete cases by the
various parties to disputes. Given that a single jury may not be adequate for testing purposes, the question of how many juries should
be included in the test sequence must be resolved. Also, when tests
are made for a sequence of juries, the question of the different theoretical import of similar cumulative numerical deviations must be faced.
Thus, if proportional representation for a given group means twenty
members, and if the lowest nondiscriminatory number is sixteen,
which of these sequences is the more serious case of discrimination:
15, 15, 15, 15, or 18, 18, 12, 12?
Rather few attempts have been made to date to resolve these
issues and to develop precise standards that will be sound mathematically and legally. Of the attempts that have been made, many are
inadequate and some are actually misleading. - Future articles by these
authors will deal with several instances of misleading computational
advice and will supply corrected formulas and procedures.
113.

See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 75-88 supra.
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Development of Selection Methods that
Satisfy Constitutional Requirements
It is important to provide the standards and computational techniques by which the composition of actual grand juries or grand jury
panels can be tested and challenged. It is equally important to make
available to those in charge of grand jury selection the tools and methods
which will lead to a constitutionally composed grand jury. The selection
process itself must meet certain requirements, and that4 the selection process itself can be challenged regardless of its outcome.1
Selection methods may be usefully divided into two types, nonrandom (or key man) selection and random selection. Both can be
constitutionally adequate methods, although each has its own difficulties. The constitutional obligations of key man selectors are (1) to
familiarize themselves with all segments of the community and (2)
not to employ selection practices which permit or invite discrimination,
for example, different color tickets for different groups. This second
requirement does not present difficult problems. However, the first
one contains considerable ambiguities and difficulties.
When can it be said that a jury commissioner has truly familiarized himself with all segments of the community? Clearly, this question cannot be answered without a prior understanding of the definition
of "groups or segments with constitutional claims to representation."
The Court has recognized not only a great diversity of characteristics
which can identify such groups (from ethnicity to religion to sex, age,
education, politics, and employment), but has also accepted as constitutional the claims of hybrid groups, for example, black laborers. While
the determination of "claims status" is dependent upon the composition
of the particular community involved, it is inevitable that additional
groups will emerge given the language of the Hernandez opinion and
the apparent increase in grand jury challenges.
If jury commissioners are to discharge their duties constitutionally, they must have some guides and standards of a general nature
by which they can identify the groups and segments of their community which are entitled to be accorded "claims status." The specific
tasks required for this include a clear delineation of the statistical and
social development of general rules which are consistent with the essence of previous decisions as well as with a democratic social philosophy. All available population listings are incomplete to some de114. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
104 supra.

See text accompanying notes 67-
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gree," 5 and this incompleteness is not randomly distributed. Some
groups tend to have much higher rates of "non-listings" than others." 6
Random selection methods are by far superior to key man systems. They avoid the great burden of "familiarization with all groups,"
and the troublesome issue of "purposive inclusion"; they vastly reduce
discriminatory opportunities in the selection process; and they guarantee that in the long run all groups will be represented on grand
jury panels and grand juries in close approximation to their strength
in the community. However, random selection is not free of difficulty.
The crucial point is that random selection can lead to constitutional
outcomes only if this selection is based on a nearly complete listing
of the eligible population. While random selection is a constitutionally
valid method, it cannot produce constitutionally valid results if such
a listing is lacking.
The population listing for a random selection process, fortunately,
needs to contain only the names of the eligible citizens. It is not
necessary to have for each citizen the additional information of this
age, occupation, race, religion, and whatever other characteristics
might be important. A random selection process gives each person
on the selection list an exactly equal chance of being chosen. In the
long run, this means that the characteristics of the population will be
accurately reflected by the membership of grand juries, without any
need to take notice of social and personal characteristics in the selection process. While the required list is substantively uncomplicated,
the difficulty is that no community has such a list, or even one that
comes fairly close to including all eligible members of the community.
A selection list can be assembled either by citizen effort, or by
the efforts of appointed officials, that is, jury commissioners. The first
method, similar to voter registration, would have eligible citizens appear in person before the official in charge and enter their names.
Voter registration could feasibly serve a dual function, and it in fact
does serve this dual function in the selection of federal grand and
petit juries and in the selection of many state petit juries.
Although voter registration lists may appdar to solve the problem
of the basic list, in reality they will generally not produce the required
115. For example, property tax lists may exclude the young and the poor; telephone lists may exclude the poor, or an otherwise eligible spouse in whose name the
phone is not listed; voter rolls may exclude the uneducated and transients.
116. The obvious example is that class falling in the "poor" category who have
no property to pay tax on, no telephone or other utility, and who are frequently nonvoters.
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outcome of grand juries which are representative of all segments of
the community. Since some groups tend to be vastly underrepresented on voter registration lists, such use will create a strong and
persistent bias towards the more "advantaged" sections of the community. In recognition of the fact that voter registration lists may
be deficient, the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 permits the use of additional sources of names.11 7 It is not difficult to
anticipate litigation which will challenge the exclusive use of voter registration lists, and given the necessarily biased outcome of such usage,
it is not inconceivable that supplementation of voter registration lists
may become mandatory for both federal and state selection.
The problem, then, is to find or construct supplementary lists,
which, while also incomplete, do not suffer from the same deficiencies
as the voter registration lists. The various lists together must provide
a nearly complete roster of the eligible citizens. Only then can the
outcomes of the selection meet constitutional requirements. Many alternative lists that exist are likely to suffer from deficiencies similar
to those voter registration lists. For example, citizens not registered
to vote will frequently not be on the tax rolls, and will not have a
telephone or a driver's license. Some existing lists will tend to be
compensating, for example, welfare rolls. Some other lists may be
fairly complete, for example, the customer record of the gas or electric company.
To what degree the various possible lists can compensate for each
other's deficiencies, and to what degree they will provide a complete
roster is an entirely unexplored question. Many different tasks will
be required to provide answers. For example, a thorough "census"
of some communities to establish the base line against which the lists
can be compared will be necessary. The problem of obtaining the
various lists will have to be solved. Private records are not normally
available to jury commissioners, and even some public records may
be unavailable because they contain confidential materials. The lists
that can be obtained must be assembled and cleared of duplications.
The difference between the master list and the "census" base line
will have to be ascertained for each population group. Finally, statistical computations must be made to see whether the differences for
the various groups differ from each other within the range of chance,
or whether biases remain.
If available lists cannot adequately supplement the voter registra117. 28 U.S.C. 1863 (1970).
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tion roster, new lists must be constructed. At this point the task of
registration shifts from the citizen to the person in charge of grand
jury selection. The problems incumbent in the construction of supplementary lists do not differ greatly from those encountered in the
construction of lists when no pre-existing records are employed. But
even when the jury commissioner alone is responsible for assembling
the basic selection list it will still be advantageous to draw on existing
public and private records and to construct new lists only as much
as necessary. To construct original lists requires a survey of the community, which is a very expensive undertaking.
Again, however, there is very little knowledge about the feasibility and expense of "saturation" surveying of communities. The
usual sample surveys of public opinion research serve different purposes and do not provide reliable guidance. It is important then, to
find ways in which communities can be surveyed without again missing those who have been missed by other surveys; to discover the cost
of such an undertaking; to discover what resistance and difficulties
may be encountered; and to see whether "reasonable" efforts can produce a basic selection list that is sufficiently complete and free of
bias. The specific tasks required for these purposes are similar to
those discussed in connection with the testing of existing lists.
While the construction of adequate listings is the key problem,
there are also a number of additional tasks. Once the list has been
assembled, a choice must be made from among a variety of specific
random selection methods. Names can be drawn by the use of a table of random numbers, or by pulling slips of paper from an urn, or
by using a specific interval on the list, for example, every thousandth
name, or by other methods. The several methods, however, are not
equivalent in expense and convenience, nor are they equivalent
in their statistical quality. One additional task, then, is to provide an
inventory of acceptable random methods, together with a commentary
on their respective strengths and weaknesses.
A final question that requires attention is that of long run results.
Random methods will not guarantee (nor will any other method) that
each grand jury or grand jury panel will be a fairly accurate reflection of the many groups of the community. For a sequence of juries,
however, random selection will guarantee that the cumulative composition will closely resemble proportional representation. What remains to be explored is the issue of the size of the sequence. Should
matters "even out" after four successive juries, after eight, after
twelve, or after what number?
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There cannot be a single answer to this question. The appropriate size of the sequence will depend on the relative social complexity
of the community. The sequence will be shorter in more homogeneous communities and longer in the more heterogeneous ones. At
present, however, there is no knowledge about the proper length of
the sequence in any type of community. Yet the matter is of considerable importance. As seen earlier, the Court has held that
in some situations the test for the constitutionality of the selection outcome must be applied not to a single grand jury or grand jury panel,
but to a sequence of such bodies. 118 The Court, however, has given
no indication how large this sequence should be. Since the results
of the test will differ depending on what sequence is taken into account, equal protection of the laws will not be satisfied if the length
of the sequence is left to accident, chance, or arbitrary factors.
The particular tasks required to resolve the long run problem are those
of a series of probability computations for communities of different
size and complexity in relation to grand jury panels of different size.
Benefits and Beneficiaries
When brought to a successful conclusion, the inquiries and tasks
proposed in this article should benefit a great many persons and institutions in various ways. The most obvious beneficiaries will be persons who become -the object of grand jury proceedings, whether
these proceedings are indictments or investigations. A grand jury that
reflects in its composition a wide rather than a narrow range of social
experience will be better able to ask for and understand relevant evidence, and, thus, fairly and constitutionally discharge its duties. As
the Court has stated:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.
It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that their
exclusion deprives the jury of perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented. 19
The various groups and segments of each community and particularly those that have experienced discriminatory exclusion from grand
jury service, are important beneficiaries. As potential grand jurors
118. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
119. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
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as well as potential defendants, members of these groups will increase
their chances of receiving the equal protection of the law. The representatives and organizations of the various groups and segments will
be able to make a reliable determination of whether or not discrimination exists in a particular jurisdiction. A determination that discrimination does not prevail will be no less important than its opposite.
Reasoned confidence in the judicial system is no less desirable than
equal protection.
Similarly, -the work of the courts would be aided. The present
lack of clear standards and uniform procedures has resulted in inconsistent decisions.1 20 Legally and statistically sound guides for decisions on grand jury challenges are much needed by judges. Both
defense and prosecution attorneys need guidance to determine which
grand jury cases merit litgation and which do not. Legislators
need reliable advice and information about the many problems encountered in grand jury selection, and about -practical and constitutional solutions to these problems. Grand jury legislation presently is an
area of considerable activity. New statutes should not perpetuate the
difficulties of previous ones, much less add new problems. Jury commissioners, finally, are a very important group of beneficiaries. If
proper guidance can be given to those who select the jurors (and if
such guidance is acted upon) there will be much less need for litigation in the future.
Beyond all the specific benefits and beneficiaries, the adoption and
institution of the inquiries and tasks here proposed will instill a renewed
public trust in government by affording access to the political process to
heretofore ignored groups of citizens.

120. See text accompanying notes 75-88 supra.

